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This Bulletin issue is based on the premise that policy
discussions about the current 'crisis' in African
agriculture will not prove useful unless they take into
account the political and organisational factors which
shape the capacity of states to define and deliver
policies. We wish to investigate the hypothesis that
many of Africa's economic failures have political
foundations, and that the economic crisis is fed by and
feeds a political crisis in the developmental role of
African states. We focus on agriculture because the
human problems it poses are the most urgent and since
it lies at the roots of both crises.
The argument that the poor performance of African
agriculture over the past decade has political roots is
shared by commentators of varying analytical hues.
The World Bank's Berg Report highlighted the
negative effects of excessive state intervention, Robert
Bates has identified the political calculus which
underlies self-defeating agricultural policies, and neo-
Marxists have argued that the peasantry is being
dominated and exploited by a state 'bureaucratic
bourgeoisie'. The nine papers in this issue have been
assembled to assess the validity of these explanations
and contribute to our understanding of the politics of
African agriculture by clarifying the terms of inquiry
and reporting the results of detailed empirical
research. The papers fall into two categories: those
dealing with broad analytical issues (Bienefeld, Bates,
Mars and Brett) and those presenting detailed case
studies of state involvement in agriculture (Morrison,
Swainson, Wolfand Pottier), with a concluding article
by Gephart which sets out an agenda for future
research from the perspective of the United States
SSRC. In this preface, t intend to draw out some of the
themes which run through the contributions and
assess their implications for both research and policy.
In their various ways, the papers demonstrate the
inherently political nature of agricultural policy
making and delivery, the fact that policies are shaped
by flows of power and clashes of interest within the
state itself and in society at large. The same point is
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palpable in Morrison's description of the impact of
electoral politics and 'bureaucratic swell' on the
performance of the Botswana Meat Commission,
Swainson's analysis of the success of the smallholder
tea scheme in Kenya, or Gephart's account of the
continued official popularity of developmentally
irrational large-scale agricultural projects.
In their broad analyses, Mars and Brett paint a picture
of across-the-board bureaucratic and political failure
in official attempts to develop agriculture. The case
studies depict a more complex and ambiguous
situation. Both Morrison and Swainson describe
relatively successful parastatals - the Botswana Meat
Commission (BMC) and the Kenya Tea Development
Authority (KTDA) - and Morrison argues that our
preoccupation with finding overarching explanations
for generalised failure has precluded detailed analysis
of the conditions for success. In specific situations,
moreover, the political factors involved in particular
interventions are too complex to be captured in a
single elegant theory. Morrison argues that the
political forces involved in the BMC do not fit well
with the Bates model of agricultural politics. Political
factors also have contradictory effects. Wolf shows
how Kenyan government policies operated both to
sustain and to undermine the vegetable cooperative
which it established; in Pottier's fascinating study of
northern Zambia we find local Party officials advising
peasants to take the free market route, while the
traditional chief and the peasants themselves preferred
to retain the option of participating in the officially-
sponsored maize scheme. The case studies continue to
suggest, moreover, that even where political factors
are important in determining agricultural outcomes,
they must be situated within complex and shifting
causal chains which include economic, technical,
ecological and social factors, both domestic and
international.
These important qualifications aside, the conclusion
which emerges from these papers, and from the
discussions which gave rise to them, is that the impact
of government policies on agricultural performance
has in general been highly problematic, where not
disastrous. In terms of conclusions, therefore, there is
substantial agreement with the prevailing conventional
wisdom. But we are also arguing the need for a basic
rethinking and clarification of the factors involved in
producing failure, and seeking to redefine the terms of
debate. In the first two papers there is a debate over the
explanatory merits of Robert Bates' analysis of the
politics of agricultural policy. Though Bates' work
may be faulted, as Bienefeld suggests, for the
restrictiveness of its assumptions and its exclusion of
certain central factors (notably the international), he
has advanced our understanding by sensitising us to
some of the central political determinants of
agricultural failure and the importance of internal as
opposed to external factors in the development policy
equation. The two authors agree, in their different
ways, on 'the need to go further' in analysis and
research. Bienefeld argues that narrowly political
analysis of the Bates type should be integrated into a
wider political-economy framework which incor-
porates historical, economic and social, domestic and
international factors. Bates emphasises the need for
precise research which traces the interaction of
internal and external politico-economic forces,
investigating the variations in government response to
international market pressures and the room for
policy manoeuvre in specific situations. In my view,
this debate points to a need for analytical synthesis, as
opposed to increasingly arid polemics (internal vs
external factors, for example) or exercises in over-
simplified abstraction (such as the cruder forms of
public choice theory or Marxist class analysis).
In their contributions, Mars and Brett invite us to
reflect on the nature of state institutions themselves
and their relationship with their clientele. Mars locates
the failure of African states within the wider
framework of the failure of complex organisations
generally - in the First, Second or Third Worlds. He
argues the need to focus on the precise relationships
which make up 'the inner world of the state' and to
recognise the contributions made by organisation
theory to an understanding of administrative
performance and rehabilitation. Brett challenges three
basic assumptions which have underlain thinking
about the relationship between state and peasants, and
puts forward a theory of state action which rejects the
Weberian conception of bureaucracy as instrument
and emphasises the need to see state officials as class
actors who use bureaucratic organisations to further
their own interests through the appropriation of
monopoly rents.
In addition to these strong emphases on the need to
clarify our understanding of political processes and
administrative institutions, the papers contain two
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other analytical sub-themes which call for further
work. First, in addition to increasing our knowledge
of the structure and behaviour of states, we need to do
the same for markets. This implies a recognition that.
just as the state is a complex network of economic
relationships, the market is a complex matrix of socio-
political relationships. Each contains highly variable
processes which may produce very divergent outcomes
in different economic, cultural and social contexts.
Accordingly, the range of policy alternatives they offer
varies greatly across contexts and issues and the
maxim 'more market less state' makes a crude
intellectual tool. While we are rightly shedding some
of our earlier illusions about the omnipotence of
states, we should hardly replace them with equally
untenable illusions about the putative power of
markets. Second, under the scrutiny of the research
microscope (and indeed in the light of everyday
experience), the traditional antitheses of 'state-
market', 'public-private' are clearly unsatisfactory. As
the literature on corporatism points out, public policy
involves a complex intertwining of the public and
private, with certain hybrid institutions playing a
crucial bridging role (Swainson's study of the KTDA
is interesting on this point).
What are the policy implications of these analyses? Do
they point towards any policy 'solutions' to Africa's
current agricultural malaise? True, this Bulletin is
heavy on analysis and description, light on 'solutions'.
This is partly because it is important to get our ideas as
well as our facts straight before plunging into the
treacherous quagmire of policy analysis it is partly
because we have identified policy problems as rooted
in political and institutional factors, which make them
that much more intractable, for domestic as well as
external policy actors.
I am viewing these issues as a specialist on East Asian,
not African development. While it is important to
eschew the simple-minded search for transferable
'lessons', the East Asian experience does prove
instructive in viewing the African context. As recent
research at this Institute has demonstrated, the success
of East Asian NICs has relied heavily on strong states,
on their capacity to intervene effectively and
implement 'sound' policies, a capacity which in turn is
rooted in certain basic givens a strong sense of
cultural cohesion and national identity, social and
political discipline, a long bureaucratic tradition -
factors which arc weak or non-existent in many
African contexts. This experience suggests that
successful national development requires a strong
state and unified polity which not only can define and
implement the strategic 'national rationality' to which
Bienefeld refers, but also provide a stable framework
for the growth and functioning ot market forces
(Swainson makes this point in her study of the
KTDA). From an East Asian perspective, the problem
of African states is not that they are overweening but
over-weak and vulnerable. This weakness is based
partly on the deficiencies of their bureaucratic
apparatus, as Mars and Brett demonstrate. This must
also be set against a context of deeper political
weakness stemming from the failure to develop strong
political organisations capable of accomplishing the
characteristic tasks of political development: the
capacity to mobilise popular commitment and
support, work out and maintain stable rules of the
political game, unify contending political forces,
define and implement coherent policy programmes,
enforce the will of political leaderships on recalcitrant
bureaucracies, and integrate their national con-
stituencies across regions and between centre and
periphery. At its root, this implies the establishment of
enduring political communities; a task that took
centuries in Western Europe. If we step back and
widen out historical perspective, indeed, what appears
as political failure may, in some cases at least, be
transformed into success, both politically and
economically.
There is a clear need for more research on African
political institutions, on electoral systems, political
parties, political leadership, interest groups and
associations. These forces provide the context within
which political coalitions favourable or inimical to
development (and specifically to agricultural develop-
ment) can be forged and sustained. The crucial
importance of a developmentally positive political
coalition, which we call a 'development coalition',
shows up clearly in our case studies of the KTDA and
the BMC. The latter is particularly illuminating in that
it documents the rise and fall of an initially successful
coalition and its replacement by another which was
less effective, but more indigenous. External forces,
including bilateral and multilateral aid agencies, are
an important component of these political coalitions,
for better for worse, consciously or unconsciously.
We need to go much further in investigating the
precise contours ofthese coalitions and the conditions
which lead to their formation, sustainability and
developmental impact. It is important to ask two basic
questions: first, what constitutes the kind of
development coalitions favourable to agricultural
development and, second, how can these emerge or be
brought about? This also raises a locust swarm of
questions about the terms for evaluating develop-
mental 'success' and economic 'efficiency'. The early
BMC was both 'successful' and 'efficient' but it
contained strong elements of neocolonialism and
racist labour organisation. In the case ofpineapples in
Kenya, Swainson argues, an economically effective
coalition between the Kenyan state and multinational
capital strangled a scheme for smallholder production.
A shift of power towards 'farming interests' may in
fact benefit a small group of large farmers whose
interests may be prejudicial to the mass of
smaliholders. Ifpower is to be shifted to smallholders,
however, how is this to be achieved without radical
political change - and how likely is the latter in any
case? How much leverage to effect such political
changes lies within the power of external agencies, and
what are the moral and political as well as technical
constraints on the exercise of such power?
The search for solutions to Africa's economic ills thus
rests on a sober recognition that the room for policy
manoeuvre is slim and is getting slimmer, as pressures
on African governments increase and the resources
available to them decrease. The search for the 'lessons'
from success stories may be treacherous: as Morrison
points out in the case ofthe BMC, the formula for past
success may become the formula for future decline; a
factor such as 'managerial autonomy' which seems to
aid the effectiveness of parastatal A, may prove highly
problematic in the case of parastatal B. Given the
diversity of national predicaments and the extent to
which basic political and institutional factors lie at the
roots of current crises, if policy remedies are available
they will be complex, and the solutions painfully slow.
There are possibilities for amelioration in several
arenas: within the state sector itself, for example, there
are opportunities available for the improvement of
public policy performance through institutional
changes drawn from sources as diverse as Western
organisational theory and Eastern economic reforms.
In relations between polity and economy, state and
market, there are potential ways in which states might
be able to improve their capacity to 'manage markets'.
At its roots, this requires a more realistic appraisal of
the potential benefits of markets and the limitations of
state planning in situations of extreme scarcity, the
search for a more balanced and complementary
relationship between state action and market
processes (Pottier's analysis of the attitudes of
Zambian peasants is interesting on this point) and
systematic attention to the potentially crucial role of
intermediary institutions (such as trade or industrial
associations, citizens and community organisations,
peasant associations, supply and marketing co-
operatives, etc.) which serve as essential linkages
between state and population and mechanisms
through which social forces can mobilise power
against corrupt or ineffectual bureaucracies and self-
serving politicians.
There is a long way to go towards understanding the
complex ways in which political and institutional
factors shape policy agendas, determine policy
outcomes and condition the feasibility of policy
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reforms. On the academic side, both Bates and
Gephart present us with formidable research agendas,
though the research context is far from easy. On the
practical side, if research on political and institutional
factors is to prove a useful component of the policy
process, its results need to be taken more seriously; the
hegemony of the economist as the arbiter of 'realism'
should be challenged and the organisation of policy
advice needs to be changed (for example, through the
inclusion of political scientists on team missions). This
can contribute not only to a greater awareness on the
part of external agencies about the political
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dimensions of policy processes within African
societies but also greater self-awareness of their own
political role and impact.
The urgency of these issues calls for a great deal of
work at both theoretical and empirical levels. In the
process, it may be possible to establish a dialogue
between political scientists and economists, analysts
and practitioners, which will lead to a richer and more
realistic analysis of policy problems - a political
economy worthy of the name.
